After defining a pure-action profile in a nonatomic aggregative game, where players have specific continuous pure-action sets and nonsmooth cost functions, as a square-integrable function, we characterize a Wardrop equilibrium (WE) as a solution to an infinite-dimensional generalized variational inequality. We show the existence of variational WE in monotone nonatomic aggregative games with coupling constraints. Its uniqueness is proved for strictly or aggregatively strictly monotone cases. We then show that, for a sequence of finite-player aggregative games with aggregative constraints, if the players' pure-action sets converge to those of a strongly (resp. aggregatively strongly) monotone nonatomic game, and the aggregative constraints in the finite-player games converge to that of the nonatomic game, then a sequence of variational Nash equilibria in these finite-player games converge to the variational WE in pure-action profile (resp. aggregate-action profile). Finally, we show how to construct auxiliary finite-player games for two general classes of nonatomic games.
function. Convergence of some dynamical systems describing the evolution of pure-action distribution in the population has been established for some particular equilibria in some particular classes such as linear games [49] , potential games [9, 43] and stable games [28, 47] . Algorithms corresponding to discretized versions of such dynamical systems for the computation of WE have been studied, in particular for congestion games [20, 52] .
Motivation. This paper is mainly motivated by two gaps in the literature on nonatomic games.
Firstly, in engineering applications of nonatomic games such as the management of traffic flow or energy consumption, individual commuters or consumers often have specific choice sets due to individual constraints, and specific payoff functions due to personal preferences. Also, unlike for a transportation user who usually choose a single path, an electricity consumer faces to a resource allocation problem where she has to divide the consumption of a certain quantity of energy onto different time periods. Hence, her pure-action set is no longer a finite, discrete set as a commuter but a compact convex set in
where T is the total number of time periods. Fewer results exist for the computation of WE for the case where players have infinitely many different types (i.e. action sets and payoff functions) or where they have continuous action sets. For example, most of the works in line with Schmeidler [10, 30, 36, 41] use fixed-point theorems to prove the existence of WE, though in fairly general settings. Besides, most of the existing work assumes smooth cost functions of players which is somewhat strong.
Secondly, in the above-mentioned applications of aggregative games, coupling constraints, especially those at aggregative level, commonly exist [23] . Examples are capacity constraints of the network or power-grid, and ramping constraints on the variation of total energy consumption between time periods. In this regard, there are even fewer studies in game-theoretical modeling of nonatomic game. However, the presence of coupling constraints adds non trivial difficulties in the analysis of WE and their computation. Indeed, an appropriate definition of equilibrium is already not obvious. An analog to the so-called generalized Nash equilibrium [25] for finite-player games does not exist for nonatomic games because a nonatomic player's behavior has no impact on the aggregative profile. Moreover, dynamical systems and algorithms used to compute Wardrop equilibria in population games cannot be straightforwardly extended to this case. Indeed, in these dynamics and algorithms, players adapt their strategies unilaterally in their respective strategy spaces, which can well lead to a new strategy profile violating the coupling constraint.
In view of these two gaps, the main objective of this paper is to provide a model of nonatomic aggregative games with infinitely many player-specific, compact convex pure-action sets and infinitely many player-specific nonsmooth payoff functions, then introduce a general form of coupling aggregative constraints into these games, choose an appropriate equilibrium notion, study their properties such as existence and uniqueness and, finally, their computation.
Main results.
After defining a pure-action profile in a nonatomic aggregative game where players have specific compact convex pure-action sets lying in R T , and specific cost functions, convex in their own action variable but nonsmooth, Theorem 3.1 characterizes a Wardrop equilibrium (WE) as a solution to an infinite-dimensional generalized variational inequality (IDGVI). Theorem 3.3 proves the existence of WE and variational Wardrop equilibrium (VWE), equilibrium notion in the presence of coupling constraints defined by a similar IDGVI, in monotone nonatomic games by showing the existence of solutions to the characteristic IDGVI. Then, Theorem 3.4 shows the uniqueness of WE and VWE in case of strictly monotone or aggregatively strictly monotone games. The definition of monotone games is an extension of the stable games [28] , also called dissipative games [48] , in population games with a finite types of nonatomic players to the case with infinitely many types.
Theorem 4.1 is the main result of this paper. It shows that, for a sequence of finite-player aggregative games, if the players' pure-action sets converge to those of a strongly monotone (resp. aggregatively strongly monotone) nonatomic aggregative game, and if the aggregative constraints in these finite-player games converge to the aggregative constraint in the nonatomic game, then a sequence of so-called variational Nash equilibria (VNE) in these finite-player games converge, in pure-action profile (resp. in aggregate-action profile), to the VWE. We provide an upper bound on the distance between the VNE and VWE, specified as a function of the parameters of the finite-player and nonatomic games.
This result allows the construction of an auxiliary sequence of finite-player games with finite-dimensional VNE so as to approximate the infinite-dimensional VWE in the special class of strongly or aggregatively strongly monotone nonatomic aggregative games, with or without aggregative constraints. Since there are much more results [17] on the resolution of finite-dimensional variational inequalities characterizing VNE, we can therefore obtain an approximation of the VWE with arbitrary precision.
Finally, we show how to construct an AAS for two general classes of nonatomic games.
Related work.
Extensive research has been conducted on Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic congestion games via their formulation with variational inequalities [34] , while the similar characterization of Nash equilibria in atomic splittable games, where players have continuous action sets in contrast to unsplittable games where players have finite action sets, has been less studied [27, 40] . In addition to their existence and uniqueness, the computational and dynamical aspects of equilibria as solutions to variational inequalities have also been studied [11, 46, 52, 54] . However, in most cases, the variational inequalities involved have finite dimensions, as opposed to the case of Wardrop equilibrium in this paper. Marcotte and Zhu [35] consider nonatomic players with continuous types (leading to a characterization of the Wardrop equilibrium as an infinite-dimensional variational inequality) and studied the equilibrium in an aggregative game with nonatomic players differentiated through a linear parameter in their cost function. Some results have already been given to quantify the relationship between Nash and Wardrop equilibria. Haurie and Marcotte [27] show that in a sequence of atomic splittable games where atomic splittable players are replaced by smaller and smaller equal-size players with constant total weight, Nash equilibria converge to the Wardrop equilibrium of a nonatomic game. Their proof is based on the convergence of variational inequalities corresponding to the sequence of Nash equilibria, a technique similar to the one used in this paper. Wan [50] generalizes this result to composite games where nonatomic players and atomic splittable players coexist, by allowing the atomic players to replace themselves by players with heterogeneous sizes.
Gentile et al. [21] consider a specific class of finite-player aggregative games with linear coupling constraints. They use the variational inequality formulations for the unique generalized Nash equilibrium and the unique generalized Wardrop-type equilibrium (which consists in letting each finite player act as if she was nonatomic) of the same finite-player game to show that, when the number of players grows, the former can be approximated by the latter. There are several differences between our model and theirs. Firstly, we consider nonatomic games with players of infinitely-many different types instead of finiteplayer games only. Secondly, we consider variational Nash and Wardrop equilibria instead of generalized equilibria (which does not exist in nonatomic games). In contrast to generalized equilibria, a variational equilibrium is not characterized by a best reply condition for each of the finite or nonatomic players, which makes the study of its properties much more difficult, as shown in Section 4. Thirdly, we allow for nonsmooth cost functions and general form of coupling constraints while they consider differentiable cost functions and linear coupling constraints.
Milchtaich [38] studies finite and nonatomic crowding games (similar to aggregative games), where players have finitely many pure actions, and shows that, if each player in an n-person game is replaced by m identical replicas with constant total weight, pure Nash equilibria generically converge to the unique equilibrium of the limit nonatomic game as m goes to infinity. His proof is not based on a variational inequality formulation.
Structure. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the definition of finiteplayer aggregative games with and without aggregative constraints, the notion of equilibrium in these cases and their properties. Section 3 is dedicated to nonatomic aggregative games with and without aggregative constraints. After defining Wardrop equilibrium and variational Wardrop equilibrium, we concentrate on the special class of monotone games and show the existence and uniqueness of equilibria there via generalized infinite dimensional variational inequalities. In Section 4, we give the definition of an approximating sequence of finite-player games for a nonatomic aggregative game with or without coupling constraints, and present the main theorem of the paper on the convergence of the sequence of (variational) Nash equilibria of the approximating finite-player games to the (variational) Wardrop equilibrium of the nonatomic game. The construction of such a sequence of approximating finite-player games is shown for two important classes of nonatomic games.
Notations.
Vectors are denoted by a bold font (e.g. x) as opposed to scalars (e.g. x).
The transpose of vector x is denoted by x τ . The closed unit ball in a metric space, centered at x and of radius η, is denoted by N η (x). For a nonempty convex set C in a Hilbert space H (over R),
• rbd C is the relative boundary of C in H, i.e. the boundary of C in span C. (y, B) }. Later, we will define new metrics indexed by ν in Euclidean spaces. The point-set distances and Hausdorff distances are defined similarly and denoted with index ν.
The subdifferential, i.e. set of subgradients of a convex function f at
For a function (x, X) → f (x, X) of two explicit variables, convex in x, we denote by ∂ 1 f (x, X) the (nonempty) subdifferential of function f (·, X) for any fixed X.
Finite-player aggregative games
This section recalls the definition of finite-player aggregative games with and without coupling aggregative constraints, and some notions of equilibrium in these games as well as their characterization by generalized variational inequalities. 
for each player i, so that a player's cost is determined by her own action and the aggregate action profile.
Denote X X 1 × · · · × X I . The pure-action profile of the players x (x i ) i∈I induces an aggregateaction profile load attributed to arc t ∈ T , which is denoted by X = (X t ) T t=1 where X t = i∈I x i,t . Denote the set of feasible aggregate-action profiles by X {X ∈ R T : ∃x ∈ X s.t. i∈I x i = X}. Denote the game by G = (I, X , (f i ) i∈I ).
The following assumptions and notations are adopted in this paper.
Assumption 1 (Convex costs). For each
, where X −i = j∈I,j =i x j , is continuous in x i and in X −i , and is convex in x i for all x −i = (x j ) j∈I,j =i ∈ j∈I,j =i X j . Assumption 2 (Convex and compact strategy sets). For each i ∈ I, the set X i is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of R T . Recall the definition of Nash Equilibrium in finite-player non-cooperative games. Definition 2.2 (Nash Equilibrium (NE) [39] ). A (pure) Nash equilibrium of G is a profile of pure actionŝ
Since the cost functions are convex in players' own strategies, NE can be characterized as solutions to generalized variational inequalities (GVI) [19] . 
Proof. Eq. (1a) is a necessary and sufficient condition forx i to minimize the convex functionf i (., The existence of an NE is obtained by a classical result in game theory for finite-player continuous game, since the players have convex continuous cost functions and convex compact pure-action sets. No differentiability condition is needed.
Proposition 2.2 (Existence of NE, [15, 18, 22]). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, G admits an NE.
Remark 2.2 (NE is a unilateral level stability condition). The NE condition ensures stability not only in terms of a single player's behavior but also in terms of their collective welfare. Indeed, on the one hand, condition (1a) is equivalent to g i , y i ≥ 0 for all y i ∈ T Xi (x i ) for each i, i.e. a unilaterally feasible deviation of player i increases her cost; on the other hand, condition (1b) is equivalent to g, y ≥ 0 for all y ∈ T X (x), i.e. a collectively feasible deviation of all the players increases their total costs. The two conditions are equivalent because the players have independent pure-action spaces so that T X (x) = i∈I T Xi (x i ), i.e. any collectively feasible deviation can be decomposed into unilaterally feasible deviations. This remark is important because it is no longer the case when one introduces a coupling constraint in the game.
The coupling aggregative constraint considered in this paper is of the following general form: There is a nonempty, convex and compact subset A of R T , whose intersection with X is not empty, such that the aggregate-action profile X ∈ A. An example is A = {X ∈ R
Definition 2.3 (Finite-player aggregative game with aggregative constraints). Its only difference from the game defined in Definition 2.1 is that, for each player i ∈ I, given the profile of pure actions of the others players y −i ∈ j∈I\{i} X j , her feasible pure-action set becomes
where X (A) is a subset of X defined by
This game is denoted by
Finite-player non-cooperative games with coupling constraints are called generalized Nash games [25] . The extension from games to generalized games is not trivial. In the case with no coupling constraint, the pure-action spaces of the players are independent so that any collectively feasible deviation can be decomposed into unilaterally feasible deviation. This property does not always hold with a coupling constraint. To see this, we recall the following notion of generalized equilibrium in generalized games. Definition 2.4 (Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE), [25] ). A profile of pure actionsx ∈ X is a generalized Nash equilibrium of G(A) if
Its characterization by generalized quasi-variational inequalities (GQVI) [12] can be proved as for Proposition 2.1 .
Proposition 2.3 (GQVI formulation of GNE). Under Assumptions 1 and 2,x ∈ X is a GNE of G(A) if and only if one of the following two equivalent conditions holds:
∀i ∈ I :x i ∈ X (x −i ) and ∃ g i ∈ ∂ 1fi (x i ,X −i ) s.t. g i , x i −x i ≥ 0, ∀x i ∈ X i (x −i ) (2a) x ∈ X (x) i∈I X i (x −i ) and ∃ g ∈ H(x) s.t. g, x −x ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X (x) . (2b)
Remark 2.3 (Problematics of GNE)
. The notion of GNE can be problematic. Given a pure-action profile x ∈ X (A), firstly simultaneous unilateral deviations can lead to a new profile out of X (A). Secondly, if X (x) ∩ X (A) is a proper set of X (A), profiles in X (A) \ X (x) are not feasible. Indeed, the unilateral stability condition (2a) is equivalent to collective stability only among those collective deviations composed by unilaterally feasible deviations, i.e. condition (2b), because
Collective deviations towards X (A)\ X (x) are not composed by unilaterally feasible deviations while they may effectively decrease the total cost or even each player's cost (cf. [25] for an example). A GNE can thus lose its stability when such collective deviations are allowed. To answer to this issue, we consider the stronger notion of equilibrium defined below:
Definition 2.5 (Variational Nash Equilibrium (VNE), [25] ). A solution to the following GVI problem:
is called a variational Nash equilibrium of G(A). In particular, if X ⊂ A, a VNE is a NE.
A pure-action profilex ∈ X (A) is a VNE if and only if a collective deviation to any profile in X (A) is not collectively beneficial. Indeed, VNE is also unilaterally stable, because it is a GNE [25, Theorem 3].
Proposition 2.4 ([25]). In G(A), under Assumption 2, any VNE is a GNE.

Remark 2.4 (VNE refines GNE)
. VNE can be seen as a refinement of GNE [31] . With a small perturbation of A, a GNE which is not a VNE can no longer be an equilibrium. Harker [25] gives an example of a GNE which is not a VNE.
Hence, VNE is adopted in this paper as the equilibrium notion in the presence of aggregative constraints. Moreover, in Section 3.3 it is argued that the notion of generalized equilibrium cannot even be established in nonatomic games.
Proposition 2.5 (Existence of VNE). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, G(A) admits a VNE.
Proof. From the convexity of eachf i , we deduce that H is a nonempty, convex, compact valued, upper hemicontinuous correspondence. Then [12, Corollary 3.1] shows that the GVI problem (3) admits a solution on the finite dimensional convex compact X (A). (In the case that thef i is partially differentiable with respect to x i , then the GVI is reduced to a VI, and Lemma 3.1 in [26] suffices to show the existence of a solution.)
A Continuum of Players: Nonatomic Framework
Nonatomic aggregative games
In nonatomic aggregative games considered here, players have compact pure-action sets, and heterogeneous pure-action sets as well as heterogeneous cost function. This model is in line with the Schmeidler's seminal paper [45] , but in contrast to most of the population games studied in game theory [29, 44] where nonatomic players are grouped into several populations, with players in the same population have the same finite pure-action set and the same cost function. x θ,t dθ denotes the aggregate-action profile.
The set of feasible pure-action profiles is defined by:
Denote the game by G = (Θ, X , (f θ ) θ∈Θ ).
Remark 3.1. The definition of a nonatomic game asks the pure-action profile x to be a measurable and integrable function on Θ instead of simply being a collection of x θ ∈ X θ for θ ∈ Θ. In other words, a coupling constraint is inherent in the definition of nonatomic games and the notion of WE. This is in contrast to finite-player games.
The set of feasible aggregate actions is X {X ∈ R T : ∃ x ∈ X s.t.
1 0
x θ dθ = X}. Further assumptions are necessary for X to be nonempty and for the existence of equilibria to be discussed later.
Assumption 3 (Nonatomic pure-action sets). The correspondence X : Θ ⇒ R T , θ → X θ has nonempty, convex, compact values and measurable graph Gr
Under Assumption 3, a sufficient condition for x to be in L
is that x is measurable. 
Wardrop equilibrium extends the notion of Nash equilibrium in the framework of nonatomic games, where a single player of measure zero has a negligible impact on the others.
Definition 3.2 (Wardrop Equilibrium (WE), [51]). A pure-action profile
Before characterizing WE by infinite-dimensional GVI, let us introduce some notions and a technical assumption ensuring that the infinite-dimensional GVI is well-defined.
as follows:
In other words, H(x) is the collection of measurable (and integrable because of Assumption 4.(iii)) selections of a subgradient for each x θ . Next, define a best-reply correspondence Br from the set of aggregate-action profiles X to the set of pure-action profiles X :
Finally, fix Y ∈ X and x ∈ Br(Y ), define a correspondence D(x, Y ) from Θ to R T as follows:
Clearly, this is a nonempty and closed-valued correspondence. 
We need the following lemma for the proof of Theorem 3.1. Proof.
(1) For each θ, the subdifferential ∂ 1 f θ (x θ , x) is nonempty and compact valued, so that a measurable selection exists according to the compact-valued selection theorem [6] . [6] .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Given X * , (6a) is a necessary and sufficient condition for x * θ to minimize the convex function f θ (., X * ) on X θ . Condition (6a) implies condition (6b) because of Assumption 5. For the converse, suppose that x * ∈ X satisfies condition (6b) but not (6a). Then there must be a subset Θ of Θ with strictly positive measure such that for each θ ∈ Θ ,
The interpretation is the same as for atomic players at NE: no unilateral deviation is profitable. However, since each nonatomic player has measure zero, when considering a deviation in the profile of pure actions, one must let players in a set of strictly positive measure deviate: (6b) means that the collective deviation of players of any set of strictly positive measure increases their cost. Note that the GVI problem (6b) has infinite dimensions.
The existence of WE is obtained by an equilibrium existence theorem for nonatomic games. 
Monotone nonatomic aggregative games
For the uniqueness of WE and the existence of equilibrium notion to be introduced in the next subsection for the case with coupling constraints, let us introduce the following notions of monotone nonatomic games.
Definition 3.3. The nonatomic aggregative game G is monotone if
It is strictly monotone if the equality in (7) holds if and only if x = y almost everywhere. It is aggregatively strictly monotone if the equality in (7) holds if and only if x = y. It is strongly monotone with modulus α if
It is aggregatively strongly monotone with modulus β if
Remark 3.5. Eq. 
Remark 3.6.
A recent paper of Hadikhanloo [24] generalizes the notion of stable games in population games [28] to monotone games in anonymous games, an extension of population games with players having heterogeneous compact pure-action sets but the same payoff function. He defines the notion of monotonicity directly on the distribution of pure-actions among the players instead of pure-action profile as we do. The two approaches are compatible.
Examples of aggregative games are given by cost functions of the form:
Here c(X) specifies the per-unit cost (or negative of per-unit utility) of each of the T "public products", which is a function of the aggregative contribution X to each of the "public products". Player θ's cost (resp. negative of utility) associated to these products is scaled by her own contribution x θ . The function u θ (x θ ) measures the private utility of player θ (resp. negative of private cost) for the contribution x θ . For instance, in a public goods game, −c t (X t ) is the common per-unit payoff for using public good t, determined by the total contribution X t , while −u θ (x θ ) is player θ's private cost of supplying x θ to the public goods; in a Cournot competition, −c t (X t ) is the common market price for product t, determined by its total supply X t , while −u θ (x θ ) is player θ's private cost of producing x θ,t unit of product t for each product t; in a congestion game, c t (X t ) is the common per-unit cost for using arc t in a network, determined by the aggregate load X t on arc t, while u θ (x θ ) is player θ's private utility of her routing or energy consuming choice x θ .
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions 3 to 5, in a nonatomic aggregative game G with cost functions of form (10), assume that c is monotone on M and, for each θ, u θ is a concave function on M. Then: (1) G is a monotone game. (2) If u θ is strictly concave on M for all θ ∈ Θ, then G is a strictly monotone game. (3) If c is strictly monotone on M, then G is an aggregatively strictly monotone game. (4) If u θ is strongly concave on M with modulus α θ for each θ ∈ Θ and inf θ∈Θ α θ = α > 0, then G is a strongly monotone game with modulus α. (5) If c is strongly monotone on M with β, then G is an aggregatively strongly monotone game with modulus β.
Proof. (1) Let x, y ∈ X and X = x, Y = y. For each θ,
Then, given x, y ∈ X , with g θ ∈ ∂(−u θ )(x θ ) and h θ ∈ ∂(−u θ )(y θ ) for each θ, one has g θ (x θ ) − h θ (y θ ), x θ − y θ ≥ 0 because u θ is concave so that ∂(−u θ ) is a monotone correspondence on X θ . Then
The proof for (2)- (5) is omitted.
In particular, if c(X) = (c t (X t )) t∈T , then c is monotone if c t 's are all non-decreasing, and c is strongly monotone if c t 's are all strictly increasing.
Nonatomic aggregative games with aggregate constraints
Let us consider the aggregative constraint in nonatomic aggregative game G: X ∈ A, where A is a convex compact subset of R T such that A ∩ X = ∅. Let X (A) be a subset of X defined by X (A) {x ∈ X :
the nonatomic game with aggregative constraint G(A).
In contrast to games with finitely many players, a generalized equilibrium in the style of Definition 2.4 is not well-defined in a nonatomic game. Indeed, since the impact of a nonatomic player's choice on the aggregative profile is negligible, the feasible pure-action set of a nonatomic player θ facing the choices of the others x −θ in a game with coupling constraint is not a well-established notion: either x −θ ∈ A then X θ = X , or x −θ / ∈ A then X θ = ∅. Departing from a pure-action profile in X (A), simultaneous unilateral deviations by the players can lead to any profile in X . If only profiles in X (A) are allowed to be attained, then one lands on a notion similar to VNE. Indeed, the most natural notion of equilibrium with the presence of aggregative constraint is the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium, where feasible deviations are defined on a collective basis.
Definition 3.4 (Variational Wardrop Equilibrium (VWE)). A solution to the following infinite dimensional GVI problem:
Find x * ∈ X (A) and g ∈ H(x * ) s.t.
is called a variational Wardrop equilibrium of G(A), where the correspondence H is as defined by Eq. (4).
Remark 3.7 (Justification for VWE)
. From a game theoretical point of view, the notion of VWE can be problematic as well. Each nonatomic player can deviate unilaterally without having any impact on the aggregate profile. The unilateral stability as for NE and VNE (cf. Remarks 2.2 and 2.4) is lost. However, our main theorem, Theorem 4.1, shows that VWE can be seen as the limit of a sequence of VNE which are unilaterally stable. Finally, in the literation of congestion games, the equilibrium notion characterized by VI of form (11) but in finite dimension and with smooth cost functions has long been studied. For example, see [14, 32, 33, 53] and references therein.
The following facts are needed for later use. Under Assumption 3:
• X is a nonempty, convex, closed and bounded subset of L
• X (A) is a nonempty, convex and closed subset of X ;
• X and A ∩ X are nonempty, convex and compact subsets of R T .
We omit the proof and only point out that X and X are nonempty because of Assumption 3 and the measurable selection theorem of Aumann [5] , while aggregate-action set X is compact by [4, Theorem 4] . Theorem 3.3 shows the existence of VWE via the VI approach. Compared with Theorem 3.2, much stronger conditions are required on cost functions.
Assumption 6 (Continuity of cost function in aggregate action). For each θ ∈ Θ and x
θ ∈ M, f θ (x θ , ·) is continuous on M.
Theorem 3.3 (Existence of VWE). Under Assumptions 3, 4 and 6, if nonatomic game with coupling constraint G(A) is monotone on X (A), then a VWE exists.
Proof. Let us apply [16, Corollary 2.1] to show that Eq. (11) 
) and
). Let us show that g ∈ H(x).
Denote X = x and X
θ 's are uniformly bounded by B f . Therefore, X) . Since the limit of measurable functions is measurable, g is measurable. Hence g ∈ H(x), which concludes the proof.
Theorem 3.4 (Uniqueness of VWE). Under Assumptions 3 and 4: (1) if G(A) is strictly monotone on X (A), then it has at most one VWE; (2) if G(A) is aggregatively strictly monotone on X (A), then all VWE of G(A) have the same aggregative profile; (3) if G (without aggregative constraint) is only aggregatively strictly monotone but, for each θ ∈ Θ and all Y ∈ M, f θ (x, Y ) is strictly convex in x, then there is at most one WE.
Proof. Suppose that x, y ∈ X (A) are both VWE. Let X = x and Y = y. According to Theorem 3.1, there exist g ∈ H(x) an h ∈ H(y) such that Θ g θ , y θ − x θ dθ ≥ 0 and Θ h θ , x θ − y θ dθ ≥ 0. Adding up these two inequalities yields Θ g θ − h θ , y θ − x θ dθ ≥ 0.
(1) If G(A) is a strictly monotone game, then Θ g θ − h θ , x θ − y θ dθ = 0 and thus x = y almost everywhere.
(2-3) If G(A) is an aggregatively strictly monotone game, then Θ g θ − h θ , x θ − y θ dθ = 0 and thus
If there is no aggregative constraint and f θ (·, Z) is strictly convex for all Z ∈ M, then for all θ, x θ (resp. y θ ) is the unique minimizer of f θ (·, X) (resp. f θ (·, Y )). Since X = Y , one has x θ = y θ .
Approximating a Nonatomic Aggregate Game
Atomic Approximating Sequence
After discussing the existence and uniqueness properties of NE/VNE and WE/VWE in finite-player and nonatomic aggregative games, we shall study the relationship between these notions. First note that NE (resp. WE) is a particular case of VNE (resp. VWE) when the aggregate constraint set is any subset of R T containing X . On the one hand, one may naturally expect that, when the number of players grows very large in a finite-player aggregative game, the game gets "close" to a nonatomic aggregative game. On the other hand, since there is a larger literature on algorithms for finite dimensional VI than for infinite dimensional ones, it can be helpful for the computation of WE/VWE to find a NE/VNE that approximates the former with arbitrary precision.
This section shows the following result: Considering a sequence of equilibria of "approximating" finiteplayer aggregative games (G 
and span
measures the difference between the subdifferential of a finite player's cost function when she takes or not into account the impact of her own action on the aggregate profile: Remark 4.1. Roughly speaking, along an AAS, the impact of a finite player's action on the aggregate profile gradually disappears. Besides, the pure-action set of a finite player converges to the pure-action set of a nonatomic player in the subset of Θ that the finite player represents, whereas the subgradients of her cost with respect to her own action also tend to those of a nonatomic player that she represents. Finally, the aggregate-profile constraint sets in the AAS converge to the one in the nonatomic game. Note that, except the last condition on D ν , the other conditions are independent of the constraint sets (A ν ) ν and A.
Remark 4.2.
Without loss of generality, we assume ri (A ∩ X ) = ∅ in this section. Indeed, if the nonempty convex compact set A ∩ X has an empty relative interior, then it is reduced to a point hence the problem becomes trivial.
In Section 4.3, we will construct an AAS for two fairly general cases of nonatomic games.
In order to compare a pure-action profile in a finite-player game and one in a nonatomic game, we introduce the following linear mappings which define an equivalent nonatomic action profile for a finiteplayer action profile and vice versa.
First, define ψ
The interpretation of ψ 
The interpretation of ψ ν is that the nonatomic players in Θ ν i form a coalition which behaves like a finite player, so that ψ ν i (x) is just her pure-action. Finally, let us make the following assumption for this section.
Assumption 7.
There is a strictly positive constant η and a pure-action profilex ∈ X such that, for
It means that the pure-action space of each player has an (aggregatively) nonempty relative interior and that the relative interior is not vanishing along any sequence of players.
Convergence of Equilibrium Profiles and Aggregate Equilibrium Profiles
The following Theorem 4.1 gives the main result of this paper. It shows that a VWE in a strongly monotone nonatomic aggregative game can be approximated by VNE of an AAS, both in the case with and without aggregative constraints.
Recall that, according to Theorem 3.4, a strongly monotone game is strictly monotone, hence the VWE is unique, while an aggregatively strongly monotone game is aggregatively strictly monotone, hence the aggregate-action profile at VWE is unique. 
(2) If G is strongly monotone with modulus α, then (ψ
If there are no aggregate constraints, replace K A and D ν all by 0 in (17) and (18) .
Some notions and a series of lemmas are needed for the proof of Theorem 4.1. It is easy to see that Lemma 4.3(4) .
Then, in the same manner, one has d(
Finally,
. The proof for (2) is similar and omitted. Figure 2 : Difference between projections on X and on X (A). (Since it is impossible to draw the graph of a L 2 pure-action-profile space with a continuum of players, we illustrate the idea with two players.) 
Construction of an Atomic Approximating Sequence
As seen in our previous results, a nonatomic player θ is characterized by two elements: her pure-action set X θ , and her subdifferential correspondence
Note that it is the subdifferential of the cost function ∂ 1 f θ , instead of the cost function f θ itself, that characterizes a nonatomic player's type. For example, two players θ and ξ with X θ = X ξ and
where C is a strictly positive constant can be seen as identical in their behavior.
This section presents the construction of an AAS for a given nonatomic game G in two particular cases: (1) the player characteristic profile θ → (X θ , ∂ 1 f θ ) is piecewise continuous (cf. Definition 4.2) and, (2) {X θ , θ ∈ Θ} and {f θ , θ ∈ Θ} are respectively polytopes and functions parameterized by a finite number of real parameters. 
If (22) is true for all θ and θ on an interval Θ ⊂ Θ, then the player characteristic profile is uniformly continuous on Θ .
Assume that the player characteristic profile θ → (X θ , ∂ 1 f θ ) of nonatomic game G is piecewise continuous, with a finite number K of discontinuity points σ 0 = 0 ≤ σ 1 < σ 2 < · · · < σ K ≤ σ K = 1, and that it is uniformly continuous on (σ k , σ k+1 ), for each k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}.
For ν ∈ N * , define an ordered set of I ν cutting points by {υ 
ν hence it tends to 0. Let us show the four points required by Definition 4.1 as follows. i) Given an arbitrary ε > 0, there is a common modulus of uniform continuity η such that Eq. (22) is true for all the intervals (σ k , σ k+1 ). For ν large enough, one has, for each
ii) According to the continuity property, for all (
To be rigorous, we need span X θ to be the same for all θ ∈ Θ ν i . For this, we can further divide Θ ν i into a finite number of, say n, groups so that the nonatomic players in each group have the same span X θ . This is possible because X θ are all in R T , a finite dimensional space. iii) Consider ∂ 1f
where L is the following affine mapping from µ
where I T is the T -dimensional identity matrix and 0 T the T -dimensional 0 vector. On the one hand, according to [8, Proposition 16.6 
On the other hand, according to [8, Proposition 16.7] , Define the corresponding partition of the interval Θ: Θ =˙ n∈Γ ν Θ ν n , where:
To be rigorous, when b k,n k = b k or s k,n k = s k , the parameter interval is closed at the right. Finally, define the set of players I are made in this way for two reasons: firstly, nonatomic players' characteristics (the pure-action set and the subdifferential of their cost function with respect to the first variable) in a very small set Θ ν i are ensured to be close enough by construction; secondly, the subdifferential of cost function f i of finite player i with respect to the second variable X is vanishing so that she behaves almost like a nonatomic player. If we consider pseudo-VNE instead of NE in the approximating finite-player games, then the second reason no longer exists. If the nonatomic players are fairly homogeneous or even there are finitelymany different types of them, then there is no need to divide Θ into smaller and smaller intervals to regroup sufficiently homogeneous nonatomic players, as imposed by the first reason. We shall bear in mind these two points when constructing an AAS for explicit games.
Conclusion
Theorem 4.1 provides a theoretical basis for the use of finite-dimensional VNE/NE as an approximation of the VWE/WE in a strongly monotone or aggregatively strongly monotone nonatomic aggregative game with or without aggregative constraints. There are numerous research themes related to this result and our topic in general.
Firstly, one needs to find efficient algorithms for the computation of NE and VNE in finite-player aggregative games with or without aggregative constraints via the solution of their characteristic variational inequalities. An extensive literature exists in this regard but our particular case of aggregative game with aggregative constraints may lead to special methods or improvements on existing results [23] .
Secondly, the extension of evolutionary dynamics for population games and related algorithms to nonatomic games with infinitely many classes of players can be non trivial. A recent work [24] proposes online learning methods for population games with heterogeneous convex pure-action sets. The presence of aggregate constraints adds two additional difficulties as analyzed in Remarks 2.2 and 2.3. Evolutionary dynamics in population games are based on unilateral adaptations from players. On the one hand, in the presence of coupling constraints, unilateral deviations by players may well lead to a pure-action profile violating the coupling constraint. On the other hand, a feasible deviation in the pure-action profile cannot always be decomposed into unilateral deviations of players.
Thirdly, our results are limited to monotone games and the convergence result is limited to strongly monotone games. The study of nonatomic games that are not monotone needs probably other approaches. Indeed, even for population games where there are only finitely many types of players, there exist much fewer results for games that are not linear, potential or monotone.
Fourthly, other methods to deal with aggregate constraints exist, such as rationing in the case of capacity constraint of network or power grid.
